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This paper makes the point that a court decision that is open to 
an appeal is akin to a take-it-or-leave-it settlement proposal for both 
parties.  For the case to not be appealed, both parties need to “take,” 
i.e., accept, this proposal.  Thus, on one hand, if both parties cannot 
achieve a settlement by themselves, they usually benefit from the right 
to appeal.  On the other hand, a right to appeal activates the regressive 
effects that characterize settlements, which also applies to lower-court 
decisions.  For example, legal uncertainty has a regressive effect on 
lower-court decisions: if the judge wishes to block appeals to protect 
one party's interest, his or her own self-interest, or the system's interest, 
the lower court judge’s decision will be regressively biased relative to 
the higher-court decision.  In fact, this could also occur without 
strategic judges, but this would be an evolutionary process. 
  
 
* Uri Weiss is a Polonsky fellow at Polonsky Academy and the Hebrew University 
of Jerusalem.  I am grateful to Robert J. Aumann, Ehud Guttel and Omri Yadlin for 
supervising me in different phases of this continuing project.  I thank Irit Haviv-
Segal, Joseph Agassi, Kenneth Arrow, Barak Atiram, Serbiu Hart, Alon Harel, 
Manachem Mautner, and Michael Maschler for our discussions.   
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. On Appeals – The Effects of the Right to Appeal  
The right to appeal is a controversial topic.  The U.S. Supreme 
Court has repeatedly declined to recognize a due process right to 
appeal in either civil or criminal cases.1 
How does the right to appeal influence litigation and the law?  
The common wisdom is that the right to appeal may block arbitrariness 
in the legal system, correct and prevent mistakes, incentivize judges to 
avoid negligence in their work, enforce precedents, and lead to 
uniformity in the legal system and by this reduce legal uncertainty.2  
Of course, the right to appeal may impose additional litigation costs on 
parties and the legal system and lengthen the time of the legal process.3  
Game theory analysis may contribute to critically examining and 
challenging this common wisdom surrounding the effects of appeals 
 
1 See Cassandra Burke Robertson, The Right to Appeal, 91 N.C. L. REV. 1219 (2012). 
2 Robertson claimed 
that a right to appeal protects both private litigants and the justice 
system as a whole. First, doctrinal consistency necessitates the 
explicit recognition of a constitutional right to appeal-a right that 
the Supreme Court's criminal and punitive damages doctrines have 
already implicitly recognized. Second, the modern procedural 
system has developed in a way that relies on appellate remedies as 
part of fundamental due process. Traditional procedural safeguards 
such as the jury trial and the executive clemency process-may once 
have sufficiently protected due process rights. In the modern era, 
however, these procedures have diminished at the same time that 
reliance on appeals has grown. As a result, if appellate remedies 
are removed from the procedural framework, the system as a whole 
cannot provide adequate due process protection. Finally, 
recognizing constitutional protection for appellate rights would 
also express a normative policy choice, promoting the values of 
institutional legitimacy, respect for individual dignity, 
predictability, and accuracy.  
Id. at 1219. 
3 First, litigants should pay their lawyers.  Second, they may need to pay extra fees 
for the court.  Third, this is time consuming.  Fourth, it may lead to additional delay 
in the capacity of the plaintiffs to fulfill their right.  Even if they win in trial court, 
they may not use the money because they are not sure that they will not lose in the 
appellate court. 
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by explaining how much, why, and when appeals lead to these results 
and exploring the ways to improve this institution.4 
This paper investigates the game of appeals, which is not 
necessarily a symmetrical one (i.e., a litigation in which there may be 
a strong party versus a weak party).  The right to appeal changes the 
game of litigation in a way that changes the incentives of lower court 
judges.  The right to appeal may give judges incentives to block 
appeals.  Therefore, this paper argues that judges who respond to these 
incentives by choosing the most effective measures to block appeals 
will give the weak parties in an uncertain legal regime less than their 
average payoff in the higher court – something that is still better for 
the weak parties than the lottery of appeal. 
Additionally, this paper uses a simple numerical example to 
make its points, and a formal model is available in the appendix. 
B.  Literature Review 
Some law and economics papers have investigated how the 
right to appeal influences litigation and the law.  Richard Posner 
summarized the law and economics approach to appeals as follows:  
[T]he right to appeal serves two social purposes. It 
reduces the cost of legal error and it enables uniform 
rules of law to be created and maintained . . . were 
appellate courts not empowered to correct errors, they 
could not perform their substantive law making 
function (precedent production) litigants would have no 
incentive to appeal.5 
Posner is right that the capacity of the appellate courts to correct 
mistakes gives incentives to appeal.  We will present other works that 
investigate when this incentive is strong enough.  A prominent law and 
economics study on appeals was undertaken by Steven Shavell.6  He 
 
4 For my approach toward using game theory see Uri Weiss & Joseph Agassi, The 
Game Theory of the Pax Roman versus the European Union, 70 DEPAUL L. REV. 201 
(forthcoming).  See also Uri Weiss & Joseph Agassi, Game Theory for International 
Accords, 16 S.C. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 1 (2019).  In my papers with Joseph Agassi, we 
argue that game theory is most useful in recommending what games should not be 
played. 
5 See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, pt. IV, § 22.18 (9th ed. 
2014). 
6 See Steven Shavell, The Appeals Process as a Means of Error Correction, 24 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 379 (1995). 
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asked what rationale can be offered for the incorporation of an appeals 
process in a system of adjudication.  Shavell claimed that the right to 
appeal helps to correct mistakes, if  the parties know whether the lower 
court made mistakes, and if the appellate court reverses more errant 
decisions than correct ones.7  In this case, the parties will appeal more 
on errant decisions than correct decisions.8  If the appeal cost is within 
the right range, which may be controlled by imposing fees and giving 
subsidies, then the parties will appeal if – and only if – there was a 
mistake in the decision.  In these situations society may optimize the 
correction of mistakes by controlling the litigation costs and by 
investing in the appellate court instead of investing more in the lower 
courts.9 
In 2006, Shavell investigated how the right to appeal 
incentivizes adjudicators and concluded that the appeals process leads 
to better decision making because it “constitutes a threat to 
adjudicators whose decisions would deviate too much from socially 
desirable ones.”10  He argued that the right to appeal incentivizes 
adjudicators to give a decision that is close enough to the higher court’s 
preferred decision, i.e., in the case of legal certainty to give a decision 
that is equal to the preferred decision by the higher court plus or minus 
the litigation costs of a party.  
As clarified by Chad Westerland, Jeffrey A. Segal, Lee 
Epstein, Charles M. Cameron, and Scott Comparato, adjudicators are 
incentivized to implement the current preferences, not the precedents, 
of the higher courts.11  The article’s empirical research supports the 
notion that this is what judges do in real life.  
Christina L. Boyd, as well as authors of other empirical law and 




9 Id.  Friedrich A Hayek claimed, against any kind of planning, that the central planner 
does not have enough information to lead to the intended allocation; therefore, he 
saw any successful planning as impossible.  Friedrich A. Hayek, Planning, Science, 
and Freedom, 148 NATURE 580 (1941).   Therefore, Shavell’s thesis should not be 
classified as belonging to Hayek’s school.  Hayek’s students will wonder, how will 
the state gain the information required to know the ideal subsidies and fees, which 
may differ in every case?  Id. 
10 Steven Shavell, The Appeals Process and Adjudicator Incentives, 35 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 1, 1 (2006). 
11 See Chad Westerland et al., Strategic Defiance and Compliance in the U.S. Courts 
of Appeals, 54 AM. J. POL. SCI. 891 (2010). 
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implement their own preferences and how much they implement the 
preferences of the higher courts.12  The implicit or explicit assumption 
in these papers is that, to prevent lower court decisions from being 
reversed or appealed, judges need to implement the preferences of the 
highest court.  I will argue that this is not the case when the preferences 
of the highest court are uncertain and the game is asymmetric; in this 
case, giving the expected decision of the highest court is not a good 
strategy for blocking appeals. 
Both of Shavell’s works on the subject assume that the game is 
symmetric.13  This is a game between two parties who are risk neutral, 
have the same litigation costs, and are equal in terms of any other 
relevant respects.14  Shavell established the foundations, and his work 
may be the basis for the next step — analyzing the asymmetric game 
of appeals, or more generally, a game that is not necessarily 
symmetrical.  This development will make Shavell’s theory more 
useful, since the litigation game played in real life is not necessarily an 
equal one.  Whereas banks and insurance companies are very close to 
risk neutral regarding the stakes involved at trial, their customers will 
be much more risk averse.15  Moreover, parties have different time 
discounts and different bargaining power; therefore, the real-life game 
of litigation is not necessarily even-handed.16  Furthermore, in many 
 
12 See Christina L. Boyd, The Hierarchical Influence of Courts of Appeals on District 
Courts, 44 J. LEGAL STUD. 113 (2015). 
13 Shavell, supra note 6; Shavell, supra note 10. 
14 I propose to learn from Shavell that the right to appeal encourages a party to appeal 
large mistakes more than small mistakes or corrected decisions, if the appellate court 
reverses more errant decisions than correct ones (by reversing more, I do not mean 
the probability of reversal but the expected change in outcome by the higher court).  
If the expected change in the results by the appellate court positively depends on the 
size of the mistake, and if the cost of the appeal is independent from the size of the 
mistake, then it is rational for a party to appeal large mistakes against them more than 
small mistakes or correct decisions.  This is the case, since the cost of the appeal will 
be the same, but the benefit in the case of an appeal will be larger.  This lesson is 
much more limited than Shavell’s theory, but it does survive Hayek’s criticism of 
social planning and is also valid in the asymmetric game.  Hayek, supra note 9. 
15 See Uri Weiss, The Regressive Effect of Legal Uncertainty, 2019 J. DISP. 
RESOL. 149 (2019). 
16 See Reiko Aoki & Jin-Li Hu, Time Factors of Patent Litigation and Licensing, 159 J. 
INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. (JITE) 280 (2003).  The study of Aoki Reiko and 
Jin-Li Hu  
incorporates the concept of time into an analysis of patent litigation 
and licensing. [They] show that increasing imitation, or litigation 
costs with either a longer imitation lag or an extended litigation 
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types of litigation, such as insurance litigation or bank customer 
litigation, the game will typically be asymmetrical.17  Moreover, when 
we think about how to design the institutions for legal systems, or what 
games should be prevented, the asymmetric ones are very important.  
This is because the main goal of the law is to minimize evil and 
arbitrariness, to protect the weak party from great injustice, or, in the 
words of the Bible: “If ye oppress not the stranger, the fatherless, and 
the widow . . . .”18 
 When moving from a symmetric litigation game to an 
asymmetrical game, the results change drastically.  If a game has legal 
uncertainty, the lower court judge is biased against the weaker party if 
the judge attempts to block appeals.  In these scenarios, the appeal will 
not adequately prevent mistakes.  Moreover, the stronger party may 
appeal, even if they obtain more than their expected reward in the 
highest court, in order to achieve more through a settlement. 
This paper’s model is inspired by Cooter’s model regarding 
judicial discretion as a function of the power separation.19  His 
conclusion was as follows: “the court's discretionary power of 
interpretation corresponds to the set of possible laws that are Pareto 
efficient relative to the preferences of the decision-makers who must 
 
time, may have effects on licensing, settlement, and fees other than 
increasing the pecuniary costs. A higher pecuniary imitation cost 
always benefits the patentee and hurts the imitator. However, the 
patentee may prefer faster imitation to induce ex ante licensing, 
while the imitator may prefer slower imitation to reduce the 
settlement fee. 
Id. at 280. 
17 Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of 
Legal Change, 9 L. & SOC’Y REV. 95, 97-114 (1974).  Galanter claimed that 
[b]ecause of differences in their size, differences in the state of the 
law, and differences in their resources, some of the actors in the 
society have many occasions to utilize the courts (in the broad 
sense) to make (or defend) claims; others do so only rarely. We 
might divide our actors into those claimants who have only 
occasional recourse to the courts (one-shotters or OS) and repeat 
players (RP) who are engaged in many similar litigations over 
time. The spouse in a divorce case, the auto-injury claimant, the 
criminal accused are OSs; the insurance company, the prosecutor, 
the finance company are RPs. 
Id. at 97. 
18 Jeremiah 7, 6. 
19 ROBERT D. COOTER, THE STRATEGIC CONSTITUTION (2002). 
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cooperate to enact fresh legislation.”20  In this article, I conclude that 
the lower court's discretionary power in a particular case corresponds 
to the set of possible settlements that are Pareto efficient relative21 to 
the preferences of the litigants who have the right to appeal.  Yadlin 
used a similar model to analyze judicial activism.22  Yadlin claimed 
that activist courts increase their future latitude of possible decisions 
that the legislature could not override.  Yadlin also defined judicial 
discretion as the range of a court’s possible decisions that will not be 
overruled by the other branches of the government, i.e., the range of 
decisions that will not be changed by new legislation.  Yadlin actually 
spoke about the de facto judicial discretion (this may be considered to 
be the judicial discretion from the realist point of view), and used game 
theory to propose a measurement for the decision range of the judge, 
that Yadlin sees as the judicial discretion.23  This paper is inspired by 
Yedlin’s work: Yadlin examined the range of the judges’ decisions that 
will not be overruled by the other branches through the political game, 
and we will examine the range of judges’ decisions that will not be 
overturned by upper courts through appeals.  
C.  Litigation and Justice 
The litigation process may be biased against weak parties.  One 
way this is demonstrated is that they may systematically receive less 
recompense in settlements or in courts than they are entitled to by the 
law.24  How can we reduce injustice in litigation?  How can we reduce 
the disadvantages that weak people have in the litigation process?  To 
understand this, this paper will ask the following question: What are 
the distributive effects, and who are the winners and losers of the right 
to appeal?  The theory of Law and Economics may have some 
interesting things to say about the behavior of not just the litigants but 
the judges as well.  
This paper argues that a court decision that is open to appeal is 
strategically akin to a take-it-or-leave-it settlement proposal for both 
parties; therefore, it may be interesting to think about the distributive 
 
20 Id. at 227. 
21 Id. 
22 Omri Yadlin, Judicial Activism and Judicial Discretion as a Strategic Game, 19 
BAR ILAN UNIV. L. REV. 665 (2003) (Hebrew). 
23 Id. 
24 Weiss, supra note 15, at 150. 
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effects of settlements, when we think about appeals.  On one hand, 
both parties would benefit from a legal settlement; otherwise, they 
would not accept it.25  On the other hand, legal settlements do not 
reflect the expected judgments on a one-to-one basis; furthermore, 
settlements are systemically biased in favor of repeat players, rich 
people, and men against one-time players, poor people, and women.26 
Weiss showed that legal uncertainty has a regressive 
distributive effect on settlements.27  There are parties that gain from 
increasing legal uncertainty and others that lose from it.  Legal 
uncertainty leads to regressive settlements –  
a shift from a more certain legal regime to a less certain 
regime transfers wealth from risk-averse parties to risk-
neutral parties via settlements.  Thus, since poor people 
are more risk-averse than rich people, legal uncertainty 
leads to a transfer of wealth from poor people to rich 
people.  Additionally, since women are (or are at least 
perceived to be) more risk-averse than men, legal 
uncertainty leads to a transfer of wealth from women to 
men.28   
 
 
25 Adam Smith pointed out: “[T]rade which, without force or constraint, is naturally 
and regularly carried on between any two places, is always advantageous, though not 
always equally.”  See ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF 
THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 489 (R. H. Campbell & A. S. Skinner eds., 9th ed. 1827). 
26 Galanter, supra note 17, at 97-114; Weiss, supra note 15, at 150. 
27 Weiss, supra note 15, at 150.  When we refer to ‘legal uncertainty,’ we refer to the 
variance of the expected judgment of the court.  It is important to clarify that we do 
not address the probability of guessing the outcome, but rather the variance of the 
expected judgment.  Thus, a standard is not necessarily more uncertain than a rule, 
although it is more difficult to guess the outcome of a trial under a standard regime.  
For example, a comparative negligence regime has the form of a legal standard.  It is 
usually more certain than a contributory negligence regime, which has the form of a 
legal rule. 
Under a comparative negligence regime, the plaintiff may have a 33.33% 
probability of receiving 0, a 33.33% probability of receiving 50, and a 33.33% 
probability of receiving 100.  Under a contributory negligence regime, the plaintiff 
may have a 50% probability of receiving 0 and a 50% probability of receiving 100.  
Thus, in this case the comparative negligence regime is more certain, because the 
variance of the possible outcomes is lower, despite the fact that there are more 
possible outcomes; therefore, it is harder to foresee the exact outcome of the case.  
When the remedy is standard, it may decrease legal uncertainty. 
28 Weiss, supra note 15, at 149. 
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This means that legal uncertainty has a class and gender regressive 
effect.  It is important to understand the regressive effect of legal 
uncertainty, since the degree of legal uncertainty is not determined by 
nature; rather, it is the choice of society.  
Let me take an example that will explain the theory that legal 
uncertainty leads to a transfer of wealth from risk-averse people to risk-
neutral people. 
A risk-neutral and a risk-averse party – such as a bank and a 
customer – are litigating about an asset with a value of 100.  Under a 
certain legal regime, the law is such that each party is entitled to 50% 
of the asset (as in the Talit29 rule).  In other words, each party has a 
100% chance of receiving 50; therefore, the payoff function of each 
party, in money terms, is 1 × 50.  In contrast, under an uncertain legal 
regime, each party has a 50% chance of gaining everything and a 50% 
chance of gaining nothing, i.e., each party has a 50% chance of gaining 
100 and a 50% chance of gaining 0.   Hence, the payoff function of 
each party, in money terms, is (0.5 × 100) + (0.5 × 0). 
The expected judgments of each party in the two cases are 
equivalent.  In both cases, the expected judgment will award 50; 
however, the variance in the judgment in each regime is different. In 
the certainty regime, the variance is 0; meanwhile, the variance is 502 
in the uncertainty regime. 
 It is known that the vast majority of legal cases end in 
settlements.30  Therefore, it is interesting to investigate which 
 
29 Mishnah Bava Metzia 1:1 (“Two people are holding a garment.  One of them says, 
‘I found it,’ and the other says: ‘I found it.’  One of them says: ‘It is all mine,’ and 
the other say, ‘It is all mine.’  Then, one swears that his share in it is not less than 
half, and the other swears that his share in it is not less than half, and should then be 
divided between them.”). 
30 Theodore Eisenberg & Charlotte Lanvers, What is the Settlement Rate and Why 
Should We Care?, 6 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 111, 111 (2009).  According to 
Eisenberg and Lanvers,  
[r]egardless of the method of computing settlement rates, no 
reasonable estimate of settlement rates supports an aggregate rate 
of over 90 percent of filed cases, despite frequent references to 90 
percent or higher settlement rates. The aggregate rate for the EDPA 
[District of Pennsylvania] alone was 71.6 percent and for the 
NDGA [Northern District of Georgia] alone was 57.8 percent, 
suggesting significant interdistrict variation, which persists even 
within case categories. We report separate settlement rates for 
employment discrimination, constitutional tort, contract, and tort 
cases in the two districts. The highest settlement rate was 87.2 
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settlement will be reached in each regime.  In the certainty regime, 
each party knows that there is a 100% chance that he or she will win 
50 in a trial.  Therefore, neither party will agree to any settlement that 
awards less than 50, and the disagreement payoff31 of each party is 50.  
Thus, the only possible settlement is 50-50, i.e., the bank is going to 
receive 50, as is the customer. 
In contrast, under an uncertain legal regime, the expectation of 
the judgment is (0.5 × 100) + (0.5 × 0).  The disagreement payoff of 
the risk-neutral party – the bank – will continue to be 50; since, for the 
bank, the value of the lottery of the trial is the expected judgment.  
However, for the risk-averse party – the customer – the value of the 
trial is lower than that of the expected judgment.  He or she prefers a 
lower, but certain, sum of money to the outcome of a risky lottery.  Let 
us assume that the value of the trial for the customer is 25.32  This 
means that the customer’s disagreement payoff is 25, i.e., the minimum 
sum of money that the customer will agree to receive in a settlement is 
25.  Thus, the disagreement payoffs for the bank and the customer are 
50 and 25, respectively, which means that the surplus is 25.  Let us 
assume that they will share the surplus equally, giving each party 50% 
of the surplus.  This leads to an expected settlement of 62.5-37.5 in 
favor of the risk-neutral party – the bank. 
II. THE REGRESSIVE EFFECT ON LOWER COURT DECISIONS 
Although settlements are in the interest of the two parties, they 
occasionally do not reach a settlement, especially in the case of legal 
uncertainty with at least one risk-averse party.  This may be because 
of a lack of rationality or the agency problem,33 but it may also be 
 
percent for tort cases in the EDPA and the lowest was 27.3 percent 
for constitutional tort cases in the NDGA. Our results suggest a 
hierarchy of settlement rates. Of major case categories, tort cases 
tend to have the highest settlement rates, then contract cases, then 
employment discrimination cases, followed by constitutional tort 
cases. 
Id. 
31 The disagreement payoff is the payoff that gives a party zero profit if they enter 
the deal, i.e., they will neither win nor lose.  In other words, it is how much a non-
deal is worth to the party.  
32 This happens, for example, when the utility function of money is y=x0.5 and the 
initial wealth of the customer is 0. 
33 It happens when the parties’ lawyers promote their own interests, and they are 
incentivized to prefer litigation to settlement. 
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because of information problems, such as asymmetric information34 or 
optimism.35  Or, because both parties negotiate aggressively, each 
party could demand more than 50% of the surplus created by the 
settlement.36  At any rate, as will be explained later, parties who 
achieve settlement before the trial would also be influenced by the 
possibility that, in the absence of a settlement, lower court judges will 
be influenced by the possibility of appeal. 
Let us now imagine that, for some reason, the two parties in the 
above example did not come to an official settlement.  In such a case, 
the court would impose a decision.  In the absence of a right to appeal, 
the court will give a decision of 50-50 in a certain legal regime; 
whereas, in an uncertain legal regime, judges will give a decision of 0 
in 50% of cases, and in the other 50%, they will give a decision of 100.  
Thus, the average judgment will be 50 under both certain and uncertain 
legal regimes.  However, it is well known that in the real world, there 
may also be a fundamental right to appeal.  When the right to appeal is 
factored in, the results will be different.  In uncertain legal regimes, the 
lower court’s decision will be regressively biased when we have 
strategic judges, and even if we do not, then the effective (significant) 
lower court decisions will be regressively biased.  The right to appeal 
also activates the regressive effect of legal uncertainty on lower court 
decisions since, in effect, an appealable court decision is strategically 
akin to a take-it-or-leave-it settlement decision that judges impose on 
both parties. 
I will illustrate this by example.  In a certain legal regime, in 
which every party is expected to gain 50 in the higher court, the only 
decision that will not lead to an appeal is 50-50.  However, in an 
uncertain regime, in which each party has a 50% chance of gaining 0 
and the same chance of gaining 100, the result will be different.37  The 
bank, the risk-neutral party, will appeal each decision that gives it less 
than 50, i.e., 50 is its disagreement payoff.  However, the customer, 
the risk-averse party, will appeal each decision that gives him or her 
 
34 Lucian A. Bebchuk, Litigation and Settlement Under Imperfect Information, 14 
RAND J. ECON. 404, 404 (1984). 
35 Oren Bar-Gil, The Evolution and Persistence of Optimism in Litigation, 22 J. L., 
ECON. & ORG. 490, 491 (2005). 
36 This is a bilateral negotiation, and if they play a Hawk-Dove game, then there is a 
possible equilibrium that in some cases they will both be hawkish, causing the 
negotiation to fall apart. 
37 Of course, the expected judgment of the higher court is based on the lower court 
decision; the lower court result may greatly change the expected outcome on appeal. 
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less than his or her certainty-equivalent sum, let us say, in this case, 
25, i.e., 25 is the customer’s disagreement payoff.  Thus, the decision 
will not be appealed if, and only if, it falls in the range between 25 and 
50.  The conclusion is that, unlike the broader category of outcomes 
that lead to appeals arise under a certain legal regime, every decision 
between 25 and 50 will not lead to an appeal in the uncertain legal 
regime.  Let us call the range of decisions that will not lead to an appeal 
the “decision range of the judge.”  The conclusion is that in the 
uncertain legal regime, the decision range of the judge will be 
regressively biased, i.e., legal uncertainty has a regressive effect on the 
decision range of the judge.38  This result is very different from the 
result of the symmetric appeal game, such as the one described in 
Shavell’s 2006 article.39 
A.  The Regressive Decision Range Leads to Regressive 
Court Decisions 
I will explain why a biased decision range also causes court 
decisions to be regressive.  Initially, I will assume that the judges try 
to block appeals and will conclude that legal uncertainty leads to 
regressive lower court decisions; then, I will explain why this is a good 
assumption.  Later, I will assume that the judges do not act 
strategically; nevertheless, I will conclude that legal uncertainty has a 
regressive effect on the effective court decisions. 
Let us now assume that the goal of the judge is to block appeals.  
In this case, in the certain legal regime, the judge’s only decision will 
be 50, which is the only way to block appeals.  However, under the 
uncertain legal regime, the judge will decide between 25 and 50.  It is 
reasonable to think that we have both judges who are more pro-
customer than the high court and those who are more pro-bank than 
the high court and that in the uncertain legal regime, whereas the pro-
 
38 Our conclusion will not change if we add legal costs to our analysis, unless the 
appeal costs are such that they prevent one party from appealing.  Let us modify our 
main example, such that there is appeal cost imposed on each party.  In the uncertain 
legal regime, every decision between twenty-five + the appeal cost and fifty - the 
appeal cost will not lead to an appeal.  However, in the certain legal regime, every 
decision between fifty - the appeal cost and fifty + the appeal cost will not lead to an 
appeal.  We can see that the appeal cost increases the decision range but that it is still 
regressive.  See infra Section IV(C) (discussing the effect of appeal costs in more 
complicated games).  
39 Shavell, supra note 10, at 1. 
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bank judges can decide 25, the pro-customer judges cannot decide 
more than 50.  Let us explain: the maximum the pro-customers judge 
can give the customer without leading to appeal is 50, while the 
minimum the pro-banks judge can give the customer without leading 
to appeal is 25.  Then, if 50% of the judges are pro-bank and will decide 
25, and if 50% of them are pro-customer and will decide 50, the 
average judgment will be 37.5.  Thus, whereas the average judgment 
in the certain or uncertain regime with no right to appeal is 50, the 
average judgement in the uncertain regime with the right to appeal is 
37.5.  Hence, legal uncertainty leads to the regressive range and to 
regressive judgments.  When the judge thinks that the risk-averse party 
is entitled to more than the expected judgment of the high court, he or 
she will award only the expected judgment, but when the judge thinks 
that the risk-averse party deserves less than the expected high court 
judgment, he or she will award less. 
B. Why The Judge May Try to Block Appeals? 
I have shown that when a judge gives a decision within the 
decision range, i.e., when he or she blocks an appeal, legal uncertainty 
has a regressive effect on the decision.  However, why is it reasonable 
to assume that judges sometimes do so. 
First, this assumption may be reasonable because this behavior 
serves both parties: a shift from any judgment outside the decision 
range to any judgment within the decision range creates a Pareto 
improvement because both parties prefer any point within the decision 
range to any point outside of the range.  If, for example, the judge 
awards 60 to the customer, this will lead to an appeal that would be 
worth only 25 to the customer; therefore, the customer will prefer to 
receive 49 (or even 26) to obtaining 60.  On the other hand, the bank 
will prefer that the customer obtains 40 rather than 10, because if the 
customer obtains 10, this would lead to an appeal, which, from the 
point of view of the bank, is equivalent to a judgment of 50.  In fact, 
when the judge gives a judgment that is outside the decision range, it 
is worth 25 to the customer and 50 to the bank.  Both parties prefer the 
judge to give a judgment J between 25 and 50, which would be worth 
J to the customer and 100 – J to the bank.  Thus, since a decision within 
the decision range is preferable to both parties, it is reasonable to 
assume that the judge will give the decision. 
13
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Second, it may be reasonable to assume that judges will give a 
decision within the decision range because this saves time in the legal 
system.  Saving time by legitimate means (I do not claim that the 
strategy of blocking appeals is legitimate) is both efficient and just 
because increasing the time the parties need to wait for a decision also 
has a regressive effect on settlements. 
Third, it may be reasonable to assume that judges will decide 
within the decision range to serve their own interests: they may 
generally prefer that people not appeal their decisions, which may also 
be a criterion for the promotion of judges in the system.40 
Of course, the strategy of blocking appeals may be frequent 
strategy of judges because of the combination of the previously 
mentioned causes: a decision within the range that blocks appeals 
serves both parties, serves the self-interest of the judge, and it saves 
time for the legal system. 
Fourth, judges may conclude that they were just when they 
made decisions that no party appealed because no party resisted the 
decisions by an appeal; then, without officially designating the 
decision range, judges by trial and error can conclude that their 
decisions are just.41  The conclusion from our research should be that 
the lack of appeal does not signal that the judge applied the law 
correctly; rather, this demonstrates that the judge applied it in a way 
that no party has an incentive to appeal. 
Even if we do not assume that judges in every case will try to 
block an appeal, the assumption may be valid for at least a specific 
decision: the judge does not wish the case to arrive at the higher 
courts.42  It could be efficient for the judge to invest time in only some, 
 
40 See Jimmy E. Gates, How Often Are Circuit Judges' Decisions Overturned?, 
CLARION LEDGER (Oct. 8, 2016, 8:00 PM), 
https://www.clarionledger.com/story/news/2016/10/08/how-often-circuit-judges-
decisions-overturned/91269350 (“Reversal rates of over 20 percent for circuit judges 
are considered high and a red flag, New York law professor Laurie Shanks says.”). 
41 The game theories of information are used to assume that a player get a signal from 
the behavior of the other player, and it influences their behavior.  They usually do 
not take into account that the player may err in analyzing the information, what may 
lead to a chain of mistakes.  See Robert J. Aumann, Agreeing to Disagree, 4 ANNALS 
STAT. 1236 (1976); George A. Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality 
Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 QUARTERLY J. ECON. 488 (1970). 
42 See Ryan C. Black & Ryan J. Owens, Courting the President: How Circuit Judges 
Alter Their Behavior for Promotion to the Supreme Court, 60 AM. J. POL. SCI. 30, 
30-43 (2016) (“We examine whether circuit court judges sacrifice policy purity for 
career goals.  We compare the behavior of contender judges–those most likely to be 
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but not all, decisions.43  Then, judges can give the selected cases a 
chance to come to the higher court, but at the same time, can prevent 
the majority of cases from reaching the higher court.44 
Furthermore, even if the judge wishes to minimize his or her 
legal errors that would be corrected by the higher courts, it would be 
best for the judge to decide within the decision range because such 
decisions will not be invalidated by the higher court.  If, for example, 
the judge tries to guess the decision of the higher court (0 or 100), he 
or she will be wrong in 50% of the cases, and his or her average error 
will be 50 (which is the averaged error of every decision outside the 
decision range).  Deciding within the decision range will also minimize 
the number of decisions that will be overruled. 
Finally, let us investigate what will happen if the judges who 
gain promotions are those with the lowest average errors in cases that 
 
elevated to the Supreme Court–during vacancy periods with their behavior outside 
vacancy periods.  We also examine the behavior of noncontender judges during those 
same times.  The data show that during vacancy periods, contender judges are more 
likely to vote consistently with the president's preferences, to rule in favor of the 
United States, and to write dissenting opinions. Noncontender judges fail to evidence 
such behavior.  These findings provide empirical support for the argument that 
federal judges adapt their behavior . . . .”). 
43 The Talmud recognizes the problem that judges may prioritize investing time in 
the cases that the rich are more sensitive to, cases that discuss big sums of money, 
and warns against this.  
The Gemara continues to interpret clauses from the verse cited 
above. “You shall hear the small and the great alike.” 
Deuteronomy 1, 17. Reish Lakish says: This teaches that the 
judgment of one peruta should be as dear, i.e., important, to you 
as the judgment of one hundred maneh, i.e., ten thousand dinars. 
The Gemara asks: With regard to what halakha is this said? If we 
say it is with regard to the need to study it carefully and to decide 
the case justly, it is obvious that even cases relating to small sums 
must be judged thoroughly. Rather, Reish Lakish was speaking 
with regard to giving it precedence: The small claims case may not 
be deferred in favor of the larger claim merely because the disputed 
sum is smaller. 
Babylon Talmud, Sanhedrin 8a. 
44 Different scholars, such as Arthur D. Hellman, discuss how the Supreme Court 
“selects, from among the thousands of cases brought before it, the few that it will 
hear and decide on the merits.”  Arthur D. Hellman, The Supreme Court, the National 
Law, and the Selection of Cases for the Plenary Docket, 44 U. PITT. L. REV. 521, 524 
(1982).  Another question, which is the other side of the coin, may be, how the lower 
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reach higher courts?  In this situation, it is beneficial for the judges to 
have only decisions that can likely avoid significant errors go to the 
higher court (easy cases).  Likewise, it is efficient for the judge to try 
to block appeals in the difficult cases.  Difficult cases, those with legal 
uncertainty, make it difficult for the lower court judge to predict the 
higher-court decision.  Hence, in cases with legal uncertainty, those 
judges are expected to try to block appeals.  The right to appeal will 
activate the regressive effect not only on the decision range but also on 
the decisions themselves. 
C.  The Regressive Effect on a Nonstrategic Judge 
What occurs when the judge is not strategic but decides without 
considering the opportunity of the parties to appeal?  In this case, the 
right to appeal will not activate the regressive effect of legal 
uncertainty on the court decision, but only its effect on the effective 
court decision.  An effective court decision is one that is enforced, 
considered to be significant, and will not be appealed.  Effective court 
decisions will be only those within the decision range; otherwise, they 
would be appealed and lose their significance.  Thus, even if we 
eliminate the assumption of strategic behavior by the judge, legal 
uncertainty still has a regressive effect on the effective court decision. 
However, there is one important difference between the 
regressive effect on a strategic judge and that on a nonstrategic judge: 
this arises when the judge’s belief in the risk-aversion of women is 
false (there is a disagreement in the literature about whether the 
common stereotype that women are more risk averse than men is true 
or false).45  If the perception that women are more risk averse than men 
is false, but the judge nevertheless believes it to be true, then strategic 
judges will try to block appeals by giving gender regressive decisions.  
Meanwhile, nonstrategic judges will decide according to their 
 
45 See Nancy A. Jianakoplos & Alexandria Bernasek, Are Women More Risk Averse?, 
36 ECON. INQUIRY 620 (1998) (regarding the analysis of studies that claim women 
are more risk averse than men); Joni Hersch, Smoking, Seat Belts, and Other Risky 
Consumer Decisions: Differences by Gender and Race, 17 MANAGERIAL & 
DECISION ECON. 471, 481 (1996); Joop Hartog et al., On a Simple Measure of 
Individual Risk Aversion (Aug. 14, 2000) (Discussion Paper, Tinberg Institute, 
University of Amsterdam).  See also Renate Schubert et al., Financial Decision-
Making: Are Women More Risk-Averse?, 89 AM. ECNON. REV. 381, 381-85 (1999).  
However, it can be asserted that the proposition of these studies – that women are 
more risk-averse than men – merely reflects a false, chauvinistic stereotype.  See id. 
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ideology, and the false stereotype of women will not affect a woman’s 
decision to appeal, nor the decision of the other party to do so.  Thus, 
the false stereotype will not influence the effective court decision of a 
nonstrategic judge.  However, if the stereotype is true, then it will have 
an effect on the survival of the nonstrategic judge’s decisions because 
women, being more risk averse, will less frequently appeal decisions 
against them than men. 
III.  ROBUSTNESS OF THE ASSUMPTIONS 
Now, I will examine the robustness of three of our implicit 
assumptions, and I will show that relaxing them will cause the 
regressive effect of legal uncertainty on the judge to be even stronger 
than initially thought.  I will argue that the expected judgment of the 
higher court will no longer be included in the lower decision range 
because the strong side may have a credible threat they will appeal if 
the lower judge gives the weaker side the expected judgment of the 
higher court.  These modifications are interesting, since they make the 
model even more realistic.  The first modification lies in the possibility 
that a repeat player may accumulate a reputation as a tough appealer.  
The second modification relates to the possible existence of 
information problems in the model.  Finally, the third modification 
springs from the possibility that the parties might reach a settlement in 
the time window between submitting the appeal and receiving the 
higher court decision. 
A.  Litigation with a Repeat Player 
I have assumed that both parties – the bank and the customer – 
are one-time players, a scenario in which the decision range will be 
between 25 and 50 (in favor of the bank).  However, it will be realistic 
to assume that the bank is a repeat player, in which case the decision 
range may be even more regressively biased.  First, for simplicity’s 
sake, I analyze what occurs when only the bank is a repeat player.  
Then, I will analyze what occurs when the judge is also a repeat player. 
The bank may develop a reputation as a tough appealer by 
adopting the following strategy: the bank appeals if and only if the 
judgment is more than 25.1.  The goal of the judge is to block appeals; 
therefore, a judgment of 25.1 by the court, acceptance of this decision 
(but not of a decision that gives more to the customer) by the bank, and 
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its acceptance by the customer is a possible equilibrium.  This means 
that if the bank pursues such a strategy and the judge pursues a strategy 
of giving the customer no more than 25.1, both the judge and the bank 
will lose by unilaterally changing their strategy. 
However, the “game” may be made more difficult for the bank 
if the judge is also a repeat player who might accumulate a tough 
reputation.  The judge may adopt a strategy of deciding 49 in every 
case, and the decision’s acceptance by both the bank and the customer 
would also represent an equilibrium (no player will benefit from 
unilaterally changing his or her strategy46); moreover, every point 
between 25 and 50 could be an equilibrium of this interaction.47 
Additionally, I propose the following application: optimism 
may be a commitment device to develop a reputation of a tough 
appealer without antagonizing the judge.  Oren Bar-Gil showed that 
optimistic lawyers survive the litigation market because of their 
advantage in settlement negotiations.48  I propose that they also survive 
the litigation market because of their advantage in incentivizing the 
lower courts to decide in their favor to block appeals. 
B.  Information Problems 
Cases that do not end in settlement are special.  Usually, in 
these cases, there are informational problems, i.e., the party might err 
in their assessment of the legal judgment; particularly one party may 
be optimistic49 or have asymmetric information,50 and the fact that a 
case did not end in a settlement may send the judge a signal that there 
were informational problems, i.e., that the side may have wrong 
assessments of the result of the appeal.  To render a decision within the 
decision range, the judge needs to give a decision within certain 
equivalent values (the disagreement payoffs) of the parties in light of 
 
46 John F. Nash, Equilibrium Points in N-Person Games, 36 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. 
SCIS. 48, 48-49 (1950). 
47 If in a particular legal system, there is an equilibrium that the judges give in such 
interactions 25 to the customer, it may establish a strong argument in favor of 
abolishing or limiting the right to appeal.  
48 Oren Bar-Gil, The Evolution and Persistence of Optimism in Litigation, 22 J.L., 
ECON. & ORG. 490, 491 (2005).  
49 George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 1 (1984). 
50  Lucian A. Bebchuk, Litigation and Settlement Under imperfect Information, 14 
RAND J. ECON. 404, 404-05 (1984). 
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their beliefs, i.e., the judge should give a result that each player will 
prefer to the game of appeal.  The judge cannot know which party 
believes that they will obtain a higher court award.  Let us assume that 
each party may be optimistic, such that each party believes the 
judgment will be 40-60 in their favor; therefore, the bank will appeal 
every decision that awards more than 40 to the customer.  In contrast, 
the customer may believe that his or her expected gain in court is 60, 
but the customer is risk-averse; therefore, let us assume that for the 
customer, this is equivalent to a certain award of 30; this is their 
disagreement payoff.  Now, the decision range becomes 30 to 40 in the 
judge's eyes, which is even more regressively biased.  This time, even 
the expected judgment of the court is not included in the decision 
range, and the progressive judge cannot grant even this to the customer 
without leading to an appeal.  More generally, when there is no appeal 
cost, it is sufficient to have a minimal information problem in order 
that the judge cannot ensure blocking the appeal by deciding the 
expected judgment of the higher court.  If a risk-neutral party believes 
that he or she will obtain more in the higher court than in the judgment 
of the lower court (minus the litigation cost), he or she will appeal.  
C.  Settlement Opportunities 
It is possible to reach a settlement even after an appeal, if both 
parties are interested, so now let us assume that it is possible to reach 
such a settlement.51  The parties may come to a settlement in order to 
 
51 See Seth A. Seabury, Case Selection After the Trial: A Study of Post-Trial 
Settlement and Appeal (Rand Inst. Civ. Just., Working Paper No. WR-638-ICJ, 
2009).  Seabury claimed that  
[t]here are many parallels between the possible selection of 
disputes heard in appellate courts and trial courts. The parties 
engaged in a civil dispute have the option to settle a case out of 
court at nearly any point, including after a trial court decision and 
leading up to an appeal. Moreover, all litigants must absorb some 
cost if a dispute is resolved in court, and sometimes the cost can 
be quite substantial. Given the incentives to avoid appearing in 
court, economists typically view observed instances of trial or 
appeal as a bargaining failure. Such failures might occur for 
various reasons—the two most commonly cited are asymmetric 
information or divergent expectations of litigants— almost none 
of which are likely to be purely random. This suggests that, just as 
is the case with trial courts, the cases we observe in an appellate 
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save the appeal cost or in order to neutralize the risk.  Under an 
uncertain legal regime, settlements are regressive52 and, in fact, 
appealing gives the bank an opportunity to come to a regressive 
settlement.  Therefore, the bank may appeal more decisions, which 
may render the decision range even more regressive.  It may be 
beneficial for the bank to appeal, even if the judgment awards the 
customer less than the customer’s expected reward in court; in this 
case, the expected judgment of the appeals court is excluded from the 
decision range, as we will illustrate and explain in the next paragraph. 
Let us take the following game of a litigation between a risk-
neutral bank and a risk-averse customer.  If the upper court decides the 
case, the customer has a 50% chance of gaining 0 and the same chance 
of gaining 100, and this lottery is worth 25 for the customer.  This time, 
if there is an appeal, the parties will bargain to achieve a settlement. 
(This is the new assumption in this sub-section).   We assume that in 
case of settlement, the two parties will distribute the surplus equally, 
which means that the settlement will be such that the customer will 
obtain 37.5, and we assume that the parties have a 50% chance of 
achieving a settlement.  This means that an appeal creates a lottery in 
which the customer receives 0.25 × 0 + 0.5 × 37.5 + 0.25 × 100.  If the 
customer's utility function of money is y=x0.5 and his or her initial 
wealth is 0, then this "lottery" is worth 30.94 to the customer.53  
However, the bank will appeal if the customer obtains more than 43.75, 
which is the expected outcome of the above "lottery.”  Therefore, the 
decision range of the judge in this case is to give the customer54 
between 30.934 and 43.75.  This means that now the progressive judge 
cannot give the customer even the judgment that is to be expected in 
 
court are highly unlikely to form a representative sample of 
disputes. 
Id. at 1.  
52 Weiss, supra note 15. 
53 This is actually the customer’s value of playing the game of appeal. 
54 Let us be more formal and propose a more general analysis of this game: if the 
bank appeals, it has a probability P to come to a regressive settlement with the 
customer, in which it pays the customer only S (S < 50), and a probability of 1 – P 
to pay 50 (i.e., the judgment expected in the higher court) in case of no settlement.  
This means that the bank will appeal if and only if the judge awards more than  
(P × S) + (1 – P) × 50. 
Let us be more general: if the expected judgment of the upper court is J to the 
customer, then the bank will appeal if and only if the judge awards more than (P × 
S) + (1 – P) × J, i.e., more than J – P (J – S) to the customer. 
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the higher court.55  We can see that the opportunity to reach a 
settlement after an appeal may create an incentive to appeal: if the bank 
appeals, it obtains a chance to come to a settlement with the customer, 
in which it pays less than 50; therefore, the bank will no longer “take” 
a decision of 50 but will prefer to appeal and gain the chance to come 
to a regressive settlement.  Of course, this may also influence the 
pretrial settlement, as we will analyze in the next sections.   
D.  Pretrial Settlements 
In this section, I will examine the effect of the right to appeal 
on the pretrial settlements.  I will investigate the effect of the right to 
appeal on some possible games. 
Let us now modify the game, that we analyzed in the former 
section, such that there is also an opportunity for pretrial settlement, 
i.e., an opportunity to come to a settlement before the lower judge 
makes his or her decision (in addition to the possibility to achieve a 
settlement after the appeal).56  Since the decision range in this example 
is between 30.934 and 43.75, when the parties predict that the lower 
judge will decide in the middle of the decision range, they will come 
to a pretrial settlement57 of (30.934+43.75)/2 = 37.342. 
 
55Let us assume now that the bank has power to make a credible take-it-or-leave-it 
proposal.  If the bank appeals and makes a take-it-or-leave-it proposal, there is a 
proposal that is optimal to make in the condition of uncertainty regarding the 
disagreement payoff of the weak party.  If the optimal offer for the bank is O, the 
probability that the customer will take the optimal offer is q, and the expected 
outcome by the appellate court is J, then the bank will appeal every decision that 
gives the customer more than 
QO + (1 - q) J, which is less than J. 
56 I will remind the reader of the rest of the assumptions if the upper court decides 
the case, the customer has a 50% chance of gaining 0 and the same chance of gaining 
100, and this lottery is worth 25 for the customer.  If there is an appeal, the parties 
will bargain to achieve a settlement.  We assume that in case of settlement, the two 
parties will distribute the surplus equally, which means that the settlement will be 
such that the customer will obtain 37.5, and we assume that the parties have a 50% 
chance of achieving a settlement.  This means that an appeal creates a lottery in which 
the customer receives 0.25 × 0 + 0.5 × 37.5 + 0.25 × 100.  If the customer's utility 
function of money is y=x0.5 and his or her initial wealth is 0, then this "lottery" is 
worth 30.94 to the customer.  However, the bank will appeal if the customer obtains 
more than 43.75, which is the expected outcome of the above “lottery.” 
57  However, if the above-mentioned lower judge decides in his or her favor point 
within the decision range, and if 50% of the judges are pro-customer and 50% of the 
judges are pro-banks, then the weak party has 50% chance to obtain 30.934, and 50% 
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Let us now analyze another game, in which the stronger side 
has the absolute bargaining power during settlement negotiation. 
Again, the assumptions are that if the upper court decides the case, the 
customer has a 50% chance of gaining 0 and 50% chance of gaining 
100, and this lottery is worth 25 for the customer.  Additionally, if there 
is an appeal, the parties will bargain to achieve a settlement, and there 
is also an opportunity for pretrial settlement, i.e., an opportunity to 
come to a settlement before the lower judge makes his or her decision.  
This time we modify the assumption of the game, such that in the case 
of a settlement the strong party has the absolute bargaining power, i.e., 
the party can make a credible take-it-or-leave-it proposal and by this 
achieve all the surplus, and we keep the assumption that there is 50% 
chance that a settlement will be achieved in the case of an appeal. Thus, 
the game of appeal is worth 25 for the customer: this is what the lottery 
of a decision by the upper court is worth for them, and this is what the 
customer will get in a settlement if a settlement is reached by the 
parties. From the point of view of the Bank, the game of appeal is 
equivalent to paying 37.5, since there is 50% that the game will lead to 
a settlement of 25, and 50% that the game will lead to a decision in 
which the Bank needs to pay 50 on average. The conclusion is that the 
decision range of the lower judge is between 25+0.5epsilon and 37.5. 
(The weak party will appeal on every decision that gives them less than 
25+0.5epsilon, and the strong party will appeal on every decision that 
gives the weak party more than 37.5.)  If the lower judge decides in the 
middle of her decision range, the result will be 31.25.  Since the two 
parties predict that the lower judge will decide 31.25, then in the 
pretrial bargaining the parties will achieve a settlement of 31.25.  
Interestingly, the weakest party improves his or her position due to the 
right to appeal. When there is no right to appeal, then the strong party 
will make a pretrial settlement proposal of 25 plus epsilon (the value 
of the trial to the weak party plus epsilon).  When there is a right to 
appeal, this weakest party will achieve a pretrial settlement of 31.25, 
instead of obtaining a settlement trial worth 25 to them.  The power of 
the lower judge to choose in his or her decision range balances the 
 
chance to obtain 43.75.  In this case, the worth of the lottery to the weak party is like 
obtaining 37.065, and the worth of the lottery to the strong player is like paying 
37.342.  Thus, given that the parties have equal bargaining power, the pretrial 
settlement will be 37.2035. 
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absolute bargaining power of the strong party.58  We can conclude that 
in these games, the appeal serves the weakest party, the party who is 
both risk-averse and has no bargaining power, in the sense that this 
time, the weakest party will get much more from the surplus created 
by the insurance of the settlement.  The explanation is that the lower 
court judge will offer the weakest party an insurance at a cheaper price 
than a proposal made for the weakest party by the stronger party, who 
is strong enough to make a take-it-or-leave-it proposal.  Appeal is 
actually equivalent to a take-it-or-leave-it settlement proposal to both 
parties by the judge, and the “settlement proposal” of the lower judge 
will be less regressive than the settlement proposal of the party with 
the full bargaining power.  The greater the likelihood that a settlement 
after an appeal will not be achieved, the wider the decision range of 
the judge will be, which will play in the favor of the weakest party!  
E.  Appeal Costs 
The result of the litigation game may change dramatically if 
appeal costs are introduced into the game and if the appeal costs are 
high enough.  First, the appeal costs may be such that the stronger 
party, and only the stronger party, will have a credible threat to appeal.  
When the lottery of appeal is worth less to the weak than to the strong 
party, such as in the above games (because of the difference in the risk 
aversion), appeal costs may lead to this situation.  This may also be the 
case because of budget constraints.  Second, the appeal costs increase 
the decision range of the lower judge, because now a settlement saves 
the appeal costs, and additionally the costs may make the range more 
regressive because the weaker party is more risk-averse regarding the 
appeal costs. 
Third, we argue that when there are also differences in 
bargaining power, the stronger party may use high appeal costs to gain 
more via settlement negotiations.  This is the explanation.  If there is 
an American rule of sharing the litigation costs and the appellate court 
will decide x for sure, the stronger party has an incentive to appeal 
even if the lower judge decides x.  If in that case the strong party has 
the capacity to make a credible take-it-or-leave-it settlement proposal 
 
58 However, this power of the judge will be neutralized if the strong party develops 
a reputation of appealing every decision that gives the weak party more than his or 
her minimally acceptable sum, and the judge will have a policy of minimizing 
appeals at any price. 
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(after the decision of the lower court), the strong party will propose the 
weak party a settlement amount of x – appeal costs, and the weak party 
will take the settlement proposal.  Thus, the lower judge will decide x 
– appeal costs, and the pretrial settlement will be x – appeal costs.  
When there are high appeal costs and legal certainty, then the right to 
appeal becomes a regressive one under the American rule of sharing 
the litigation costs.59  However, when we have legal certainty, then the 
right to appeal will not change the result under the English rule of 
sharing the litigation costs.60  In this case, a decision of x and only a 
decision of x will not imply appeal.  Thus, the lower judge will decide 
x, and the pretrial settlement will be x. 
However, when we have a game in which each party has a 50% 
chance to obtain nothing and a 50% chance to obtain all, then the right 
to appeal has a regressive effect.  After the lower court decision is 
issued, the party with the stronger bargaining power will make a lower 
proposal due to the appeal costs (this is the case both under the 
American rule of sharing the litigation costs and the English rule).  This 
regressively influences the decision range of the lower judge.  On the 
other hand, the right to appeal enables the phase in which the lower 
judge can choose every point in his or her decision range, not 
necessarily the more regressive range.  This protects the weakest party, 
since the judge is expected to give the weakest party more than the 
value of the lottery of a trial in the higher court to the weakest party; 
while, in the case of no right to appeal, the party with the absolute 
bargaining power proposes that the weakest party obtains the value of 
the lottery of the trial to them plus epsilon.61 
 
59 See Peter Karsten & Oliver Bateman, Detecting Good Public Policy Rationales for 
the American Rule: A Response to the Ill-Convicted Calls for “Loser Pays” Rules, 
66 DUKE L.J. 729 (2016) (explaining that the American rule requires each party to 
pay for its own attorneys). 
60 John Leubsdorf, Does the American Rule Promote Access to Justice? Was That 
Why it was Adopted?, 67 DUKE L.J. 257, 257 (2019) (explaining that, under the 
English Rule, “a prevailing party ordinarily recovers its own attorney fees from its 
losing opponent.”). 
61  Let us analyze the following example, in which there is a litigation between a 
strong party with full bargaining power and the weakest party.  The weakest party 
has 50% chance of obtaining 100 in the appellate court, and 50% chance to obtain 0 
in the appellate court.  The initial wealth of the weakest party is AC, i.e., the appeal 
costs (by this we neutralize the risk aversion regarding the appeal cost in order to 
make our analysis more simple), and his or her utility function is like in the 
abovementioned games.  There are opportunities for settlement bargaining before the 
lower court makes its decision and after the lower court makes its decision.  There is 
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I suggest that to protect the weakest parties, society should 
prevent the game of appeals with high appeal costs, particularly under 
the American rule of litigation costs or under an uncertain legal regime.  
However, if society can prevent the appeal costs from becoming too 
high, then the best option for the weakest party (who is both risk-averse 
and has no bargaining power) is to have a right to appeal.  Furthermore, 
the right to appeal may influence legal uncertainty.  The reduction of 
legal uncertainty improves the position of the weakest party, but the 
possible lengthening of the legal process plays against the party.  It is 
possible to conclude that the right to appeal improves the situation of 
the weakest party, unless the litigation costs or the lengthening of the 
trial are significant enough, in which case the right to appeal plays 
against the weakest party. 
The main policy recommendation that we can derive from the 
above discussion is that society should reduce appeal costs and the time 
that an appeal takes.  The desirability of the right to appeal should be 
a function of the appeal costs, the time that it takes, the uncertainty in 
the legal system, and the appeals’ effect on reducing legal uncertainty. 
Furthermore, based on the above analysis, we can reach a 
negative conclusion: it is not true that the transition from a game 
 
an American rule of distributing the litigation costs.  What will be the decision range 
of the judge?  The minimal acceptable point by the weakest party will be 25 – AC, 
since this is what the lottery of the appeal is worth to them.  The strong party knows 
that if there is a settlement after the lower court decides, the settlement will be 25 – 
AC and that if there is no settlement, he or she (i.e., the strong party) will obtain a 
lottery in which he or she will have 50% chance of paying 100 + AC and 50% of 
paying AC, i.e., paying 50+AC on average.  We will denote the probability of 
achieving a settlement after an appeal by Ps; therefore, the strong party’s minimal 
acceptable point is Ps (25 - AC) + (1-Ps)(50+AC).  Thus, if the lower judge decides 
in the middle of his or her decision range, the lower court’s judgment will be [25 – 
AC + Ps(25 - AC) + (1 -Ps)(50 + AC)]/2 = 37.5 -Ps(12.5 + AC), and this will also be 
the settlement.  This is what the weakest party will obtain, while in the equivalent 
game of trial without appeal, the weakest party will obtain 25 (in both games, we 
assume that there are no litigation costs, other than the appeal costs).  In other words, 
the gap between the settlement in the game with an appeal and the settlement in the 
game without appeal is 12.5 - Ps (12.5 + AC).  The surprising conclusion is that the 
right to appeal protects the weakest party if the probability of achieving settlement 
after appeal is low, which reduces the strong party’s incentive to appeal and which 
enables the lower court to make a less regressive judgment; however, if the likelihood 
of achieving a settlement is high, then the right to appeal protects the weak party if 
and only if the appeal cost is low.  If the probability of achieving a settlement after 
the lower court decision is 1 (if the players arrive at this phase), then the right to 
appeal damages the weakest party when there is any appeal cost greater than 0. 
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without the right to appeal to a game with the right to appeal always 
results in Pareto improvement. 
IV. WHEN THE JUDGMENT IS BINARY 
There are cases in which the lower-court judge must decide to 
rule entirely in favor of one party.  Will legal uncertainty still have a 
regressive effect on the lower court's decision?  My answer is that 
when the judge acts strategically, legal uncertainty still has a regressive 
effect, and this effect is stronger, and I will explain why in the next 
paragraphs. 
Let us take the following example: there is a 50% probability 
that the bank will win a disputed asset on appeal and a 50% probability 
that the customer will win the disputed asset on appeal; the lower judge 
must decide who obtains 100% of the asset and who obtains 0% of the 
asset.  In such a case, it will be rational for the judge who wishes to 
minimize appeals or overruled cases to decide in favor of the bank, 
given that the probability that the bank will appeal is higher.  The 
probability that the bank will respond to loss by appealing seems larger 
than the probability that the customer will respond to loss by appealing, 
because the bank can commit itself to appeal to develop a tough 
reputation; the bank is less risk-averse than the customer regarding the 
litigation cost, as the bank is not limited by resources, and as the bank 
has a much lower subjective interest rate.62  Thus, an uncertain legal 
regime has a regressive effect on the strategic lower-court judge, even 
when the judgment is binary.  This time, the regressive effect will be 
even more acute.  If each party has a 50% probability of winning on 
appeal, then the lower court—which wishes to block appeals—will 
decide 100% of the cases in favor of the strong party whose probability 
of appealing is higher. 
Furthermore, the weak party may lose 100% of the cases even 
if the weak party has more than a 50% probability of winning.  If the 
judge attributes a lower probability that the weak party will respond to 
loss by appealing than that the strong party will respond to loss by 
appealing, a judge who simply wishes to block appeals will decide in 
100% of these cases in favor of the strong party. 
 
62 For the bank, the risk of the particular litigation is spread among many 
shareholders, so it is a very small loss for each one of them.  See Weiss, supra note 
15.  
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Let us take the following example: the weak party has a 75% 
probability of winning on appeal, and the judge attributes a probability 
of 40% to the possibility that the weak party will respond to loss by 
appealing and a probability of 60% to the possibility that the strong 
party will respond to loss by appealing.  Thus, a judge who simply 
wishes to block appeals will decide in 100% of these cases in favor of 
the strong party.  However, this time, the judge's strategy will change 
if his or her goal is to minimize the probability that his or her decision 
will be overruled.  In that example, the judge will decide in 100% of 
the cases in favor of the weak party (if the judge decides in favor of 
the weak party, there is a 6/10 probability that an appeal will be 
submitted and a 1/4 probability that the appeal is accepted, i.e., if the 
judge decides in favor of the weak party, the judge’s chance of being 
reversed is 6/10 * 1/4 = 6/40; however, if the judge decides in favor of 
the strong party, there is a probability of 4 /10 that the appeal will be 
submitted and a probability of 3/4 that a submitted appeal will be 
accepted, i.e., if the judge decides in favor of the strong party, the 
judge’s chance of being reserved in this case is 4/10 * 3/4 = 12/40). 
The strategic judge who wishes to minimize reversals will 
decide in favor of the weak party if and only if the probability that the 
weak party will appeal in the case of losing multiplied by the 
probability that the weak party will win if the case comes to an 
appellate court is greater than the probability that the strong party will 
appeal in the case of losing multiplied by the probability that the strong 
party will win in the appellate court if the case comes there.63  Let us 
emphasize that if each party is equally likely to win, even this judge 
will decide in favor of the stronger party in 100% of the cases. 
Moreover, let us analyze the following possible game where 
the court needs to resolve two issues: whether there is liability and the 
size of the damage.  Moreover, we assume that in this particular game 
the first question will be appealable, and each party will have a 50% 
probability of gaining, but the second question will not be appealable.  
The risk-averse customer is the plaintiff, and the risk-neutral bank is 
the defendant.  What will be the result of this game?  This time, the 
judge cannot block appeals by giving the weak party 25%-50% of the 
 
63  Pw is the probability that the weak party will win in case of appeal; Paw is the 
probability that the weaker party, i.e., the risk-averse party, will appeal if it loses; 
and Pas is the probability that the stronger party will appeal if it loses.  In this case, 
the strategic judge will be in favor of the weaker party if and only if (1 – Pw) × Par < 
Pw × Pap. 
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damage.  If the lower court decides that the damage is 30 and that the 
bank is liable, the bank will have incentive to appeal, because even if 
the bank loses on appeal, it only needs to pay 30.  Thus, the judge’s 
best strategy in this case will be to decide in favor of the party whose 
odds of appealing in the case that the party loses are higher, which 
means that the judge will decide in favor of the bank.  This is a strong 
argument against making only binary questions open to appeal. 
V.  ON THE RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN THE COURTS 
We have shown that a lower judge's decision that is open to 
appeal will be more regressive than that of the appellate court.  We can 
draw conclusions from this about the relationships between courts.  
First, we should expect that uncertain higher court decisions will be 
applied regressively by the lower courts.  In our main example of 
litigation under the uncertainty rule, the expected decision of the 
appellate court is 50, but the expected decision of the lower court is 
37.5.  If the highest court makes uncertain decisions, this will lead to 
applications that will be more uncertain than it seems when we ignore 
the regressive effect of legal uncertainty on decisions that are open to 
appeals. 
Second, it is not enough to study the law by reading only the 
higher court decisions.  Based on the theory of this article, we 
conjecture that lower court decisions do not represent one-to-one 
reflections of higher court decisions but are more regressive.  Thus, to 
know the realistic legal situation, we also need to read lower court 
decisions.  It is not sufficient to read the lower court decisions that 
come to the appellate court because they have special characteristics.64 
Third, appealed cases do not reflect the lower court judges’ 
decisions because decisions that do not fall within the decision range 
will be appealed.  Since the decision range is regressive, on average, a 
judge's appealed cases are less regressive than the other cases.  In our 
 
64 See George L. Preist & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 
13 J.L. STUD. 1, 1 (1984) (“Virtually all systematic knowledge of the legal system 
derives from studies of appellate cases.  Appellate cases, of course, provide the most 
direct view of doctrinal developments in the law.  Few scholars today, however, are 
content to study doctrinal developments alone without regard to the broader 
influence of legal rules on social affairs.  Appellate cases may tell us which disputes 
courts find troublesome and which they find easy to decide.  But this doctrinal 
information discloses very little about how legal rules affect the behavior of those 
subject to them or affect the generation of legal disputes themselves.”). 
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main example, most decisions will be between 25 and 50, and they will 
not come to the appellate court.  However, the decisions that will be 
between 0 and 25 or between 50 and 100 will come to the appellate 
court.  Therefore, if the higher court judges gain their impressions from 
reading only the appealed decisions, they will form an erroneous 
opinion about the lower-court judges ׳ decisions; they may consider the 
lower-court judges'  decisions to be more progressive than they truly 
are. 
Fourth, we should be careful when describing higher courts as 
progressive.  They may be more progressive than lower courts, not 
because of the personalities or ideologies of their judges or because the 
most progressive judges are promoted to the higher court, but because 
the higher court judges have different incentives than the lower court 
judges.65  When the law is uncertain, the right to appeal gives the lower 
court judges an incentive to decide more regressively than the higher 
courts.  Furthermore, since the decision range is biased, lower courts 
that are more regressive than the higher court will succeed in making 
their legal ideology effective; but a progressive court will not succeed, 
or at least succeed less often, when one of the parties is risk neutral, 
such as insurance companies or banks.  Therefore, many more lower 
courts will be more regressive than higher courts and many fewer 
lower courts will be more progressive.  When the law is more 
uncertain, the gap between the progressiveness of the higher court and 
the lower courts will be higher.  We can come to hold the illusion that 
the higher court may be painted as progressive due to the uncertain 
results for which the higher court is responsible. 
 
65 Theodore Eisenberg and Henry S. Farber, Why Do Plaintiffs Lose Appeals? Biased 
Trial Courts, Litigious Losers, or Low Trial Win Rates?, 15 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 73 
(2013).  Eisenberg and Farber argue that 
[m]ultiple studies find that plaintiffs who lose at trial and 
subsequently appeal are less successful on appeal than are losing 
defendants who appeal. The studies attribute this to a perception 
by appellate judges that trial courts are biased in favor of plaintiffs. 
However, at least two alternative explanations exist. First, losing 
plaintiffs may appeal at higher rates independent of the potential 
merits. Second, if plaintiffs tend to pursue to trial lawsuits where 
they should win on the merits less than half the time, then 
potentially reversible outcomes at trial will be more likely to be 
adverse to defendants. This study revisits the analysis of the 
appellate process with a statistical model that ties together win 
rates at trial, appeals rates, and success rates on appeal.  
Id. at 73. 
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Another contribution of the game theory discussion may be to 
analyze the limitations of appeals, given that there must be a final 
decision.  Since there is necessarily a final decision that is not open to 
an appeal, the advantages of the right to appeal are limited.  As noted 
by Shavell, we have the following problem: “who guards the 
guardians?”66  Meaning, who will correct the mistakes of the highest 
judges, and who is supposed to correct the mistakes of lower judges?67  
In other words, if an appeal leads to a new trial that is not open to an 
appeal, why do appeals lead to fewer mistakes?68  Hurwicz  pointed 
out in his Nobel lecture that the problem of “but who will guard the 
guardians” is not terribly acute and could be weakened.69  The need to 
guard the second guardian conjures up the image of an infinite regress 
of guardians, and since an infinite regress of guardians is not usually 
available, this seems to preclude enforcement.  However, Hurwicz 
concluded that although bad outcomes with an infinite regress are 
logically possible, enforcement is not always impossible.70  The 
problem may be weakened if the higher guardian is incentivized to 
achieve the public good or is ethically committed to it.  Let us apply 
Hurwicz’s thesis (which is not a theory, but a refutation) to the case of 
an appeal.  First, let us consider the particular proposals of Shavell:  
society may invest special effort in selecting appeals 
court judges to ensure that their preferences are aligned 
with society’s, it may have appeals court judges decide 
in panels (to offset each other’s differences in 
preferences), and it may induce appeals court judges to 
 
66 Shavell, supra note 10, at 23. 
67 Shavell, supra note 10, at 23. 
68 If one legal mistake is much more expensive than another legal mistake, such as 
in criminal law, it is reasonable to give a right to appeal only when there is the 
possibility of the more expensive mistake, i.e., if and only if there is a conviction.  If 
the probability that the lower court will err is equal to the probability of the higher 
court erring and the probability of making mistakes in the case of an acquittal is the 
same as in the case of conviction, then the one-sided appeal right will lead to the 
same number of mistakes as in the system without an appeal or with two-sided 
appeals but to a much less expensive mistake.  This mechanism will prevent a 
conviction that is not exposed to an appeal.  However, the lower judges may be 
influenced by this right to convict, since only this decision is open to correction, or 
to acquit to block an appeal.  However, what can be the solution in civil ligation? 
69 See Leonid Hurwicz, But Who Will Guard the Guardians?, 98 AM. ECON. REV. 
577, 577-85 (2008). 
70 Id. 
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write opinions explaining their decisions (reducing 
their ability to contravene social preferences).71 
 
Shavell’s solution assumes that society can overcome the agency 
problem, and Shavell does not recognize in the problem that society 
may wish to promote preferences that are not consistent with the rule 
of law or with justice.72  Let us now propose a partial solution to the 
problem: if the highest court's decisions, including the cases that are 
not selected, are such that they are more visible to the civil society, 
media and academia, this may weaken the problem of who guards the 
guardians regarding appeals, and this is also why a critical examination 
of the Supreme Court is so important.  In other words, the right to 
appeal sheds light on legal decisions that are appealed to the highest 
court, which partially sterilizes the system, since it makes both the 
norms and the deviations from the norm visible or at least gives them 
a chance to be visible.  However, this will not hold if the lower courts’ 
deviations from the norm are not visible.  We argue that in the case of 
legal uncertainty, deviations against weak parties will be much less 
visible (since the weak parties have no incentive to appeal), which 
makes the problem of “who guards the guardians” regarding appeal 
much more acute and makes appeals much less useful in correcting 
mistakes and preventing arbitrariness. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Lower court decisions, which are open to appeal, are, in effect, 
take-it-or-leave-it settlement proposals to the parties.  Similar to 
settlement proposals, these decisions will be "accepted" if and only if 
both parties refrain from rejecting them.  Thus, the discretion of lower-
court judges is regressively biased; the appeal actually activates the 
regressive effects that characterize settlements, also with respect to 
lower-court decisions.  Thus, the regressive effect of legal uncertainty, 
for example, applies not only to settlements in the narrow legal sense 
but also to lower-court decisions. 
 
71 Shavell, supra note 10, at 1. 
72 The bible establishes: “Therefore the law is slacked, and judgment doth never go 
forth: for the wicked doth compass about the righteous; therefore wrong judgment 
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We wish to propose the following recommendations based on 
our discussion.  The first recommendation is, of course, to reduce legal 
uncertainty: legal uncertainty is not determined by nature but is the 
choice of the society.  Society determines the degree of legal 
uncertainty by determining how clear the legislation should be, what 
method the court should use to interpret the law, what the status of 
precedents should be, what the method of contract interpretation 
should be, when to prefer legislating standards versus when to prefer 
legislating rules, how precise the law should be, when the court should 
decide according to the law, what room for discretion the court should 
have, when the authorities should be bound by the law, and how 
complex the legal system should be.73 
The second recommendation is to eliminate the institution of 
champerty, so a litigation firm can appear on behalf of the risk-averse 
party.  Then, the risk-averse party can sell their legal suit to a litigation 
firm which has a much stronger commitment to appeal.  The litigation 
firm will have a much stronger commitment to appeal, since it may be 
much less risk averse, having a much better time discount or 
accumulation reputation of “tough appealer.” 
When the customer has a legal claim that gives him or her 100 
by half probability and 0 by half probability, this legal claim is worth 
50 to the risk-neutral litigation firm.  In addition, when there are no 
transaction costs and when there is perfect competition, the price paid 
to the customer will be 50.  If one litigation firm refuses to pay more 
than 49, another firm will agree to pay more.  In other words, if there 
are no transaction costs, and if there are risk-neutral litigation firms 
and a marketplace with perfect competition, the regressive effect of 
legal uncertainty will be neutralized.  Even if the litigation firms were 
not risk-neutral but were less risk-averse than the customer (which is 
perhaps a more realistic assumption), the regressive effect of legal 
uncertainty would be significantly reduced by selling the suit to the 
litigation firm. 
Of course, in real life there are transaction costs of selling the 
legal claim to the litigation firm, such as time, hiring people and 
information collection.74  Moreover, there is the moral hazard problem: 
after the party has sold its suit, it will have no interest in cooperating 
with the litigation firm.  A solution to this problem might be that only 
a certain percentage of the suit will be sold to the litigation firm.  Third, 
 
73 Weiss, supra note 15, at 149. 
74 See Weiss, supra note 15, at 174-75. 
32
Touro Law Review, Vol. 37, No. 3 [], Art. 10
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol37/iss3/10
2021 RETHINKING APPEALS 1441 
there may be the problem of asymmetric information.  Asymmetric 
information means that the party that wants to sell its suit to a litigation 
firm knows more than the litigation firm about what the judgment is 
expected to be.  The selling party knows some of the claims that the 
other party is going to raise.75  Therefore, the abolition of champerty 
is only a partial solution to the problem.  
The third recommendation may be to limit the right to appeal.  
The factual findings of the lower courts receive great deference on 
appeal, and this is a significant limitation of the right to appeal.76  
However, the disadvantage is that limiting the right to appeal reduces 
the criticality of legal decision making.  In rational legal systems, the 
higher court corrects the mistakes of the lower courts.77  In addition, 
this would increase the legal uncertainty regarding the first court's 
decision.  In fact, it is preferable for both parties to have a judge give 
a decision in their decision range rather than to have the lottery of a 
trial in the higher court.  Thus, in this case, both parties benefit from 
the right to appeal.  We also saw that the right to appeal may protect 
the weakest party in the pretrial bargaining settlement.  Therefore, we 
do not recommend adopting this solution.  However, in case of a binary 
decision of the lower court, a Pareto improvement cannot be created 
by the lower court’s decision, and the right to appeal is regressive; thus, 
it may be a good idea to consider to limit the right to appeal, if in the 
particular legal system the court makes binary decisions.  This raises 
the questions of when are the legal decisions binary and how 
widespread is this phenomenon?  An alternative to the right to appeal 
may be to have more judges deciding on a case.78  Our thesis may also 
 
75 By this we apply Akerlof’s ideas about asymmetric information.  See Akerlof, 
supra note 41.  
76 See Keni Yoshino, Appellate Deference in the Age of Facts, 58 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 251, 251 (2016) (explaining that “[w]hile the dominant view among appellate 
courts is that legislative facts should only receive de novo review, the practice of the 
courts has in actuality been much more fitful and inconsistent.”). 
77 See Shavell, supra note 6, at 379 (“What rationale can be offered for incorporation 
of an appeals process in a system of adjudication? The justification analyzed here 
concerns error correction: the appeals process allows society to harness information 
that litigants have about erroneous decisions and thereby to reduce the incidence of 
mistake at low cost (because the appeals tribunal convenes only in a subset of 
cases.”). 
78 It is interesting that the rule in traditional Jewish law is that there is no right to 
appeal but that every court should have at least three judges (however, it should be 
said that in Jewish law there is no strong rule of res judicata).  Shavell pointed out 
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form a strong argument against having binary decisions in the lower 
courts, particularly when there is a right to appeal.  Another case in 
which it may be justified to limit or cancel the right to appeal is when 
the parties bear high appeal costs, particularly when we have the 
combination of high appeal costs and the American rule of dividing the 
litigation costs or when we have high appeal costs and a legal 
uncertainty that is not reduced by the right to appeal. 
Ultimately, I see this work as a strong argument against legal 
uncertainty; however, I do not see this work as a strong 
recommendation against appeals—only in cases of binary decisions by 
the lower courts, including cases where only the lower court’s binary 
decision is open to appeal, or in cases in which there are high enough 
appeal costs.  Yet, I see it as an open question, what to do with the 
problem that the right to appeal may give the judge an incentive not to 
decide according to the law, what contradicts the rule of law? How 
much does it challenge the right to appeal? 
VII.  APPENDIX – THE MODEL 
Let us now present the proposed theory by a formal model.  The 
advantage of a formal model is that we can test the argument, 
especially its generality, and make the argument more transparent. 
J is the judgment that the more risk-averse party is expected to 
gain in the case of an appeal. 
Pm is the premium that the more risk-averse party is ready to 
pay to neutralize the risk. 
Pl is the premium that the less risk-averse party is ready to pay 
to neutralize the risk. 
ACm is the appeal cost of the more risk-averse party. 
ACl is the appeal cost of the less risk-averse party. 
Thus, the more risk-averse disagreement payoff is (J – Pm - 
ACm) and the less risk-averse disagreement payoff is (J + Pl + ACl).  In 
other words, the more risk-averse party will not appeal if and only if 
they get (in the lower court) at least (J – Pm - ACm); meanwhile, the 
less risk-averse party will not appeal if the risk-averse will get (in the 
lower court) more than (J + Pl + ACl). 
Hence, the decision will not be appealed if and only if it falls 
in the range between (J – Pm - ACm) and (J + Pl + ACl).  This will be 
 
that the right to appeal is a substitute for investing resources in the first phase of the 
adjudication by the legal system.  Shavell, supra note 6, at 387. 
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the decision range.  Further, because Pl > Pm in the uncertain legal 
regime, the decision range in the uncertain legal regime is biased 
against the risk-averse party (this is the case even when the appeal 
costs of both parties are equal). 
However, in the certain legal regime, in which there is no risk, 
the premium that each side is ready to pay is 0, i.e., Pm= Pl = 0.  Thus, 
the decision range will thus be between (J – ACm) and (J + ACl).  If the 
appeal cost of the weak party is equal to that of the strong party, the 
decision range is not biased in the certain legal regime. 
The conclusion is that the greater the legal uncertainty, which 
is actually the unilateral appeal cost, the more biased is the decision 
range.  This will also be the case regarding the delay of justice.  Given 
that the weak party is less patient than the strong party because of 
different time discounting, the appeal cost of the strong party will be 
smaller than that of the weak party if the trial takes a significant amount 
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